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The theoretical literature of industrial organization shows that the distances be-
tween consumers and ﬁrms have ﬁrst-order implications for competitive outcomes
whenever transportation costs are large. To assess these eﬀects empirically, we de-
velop a structural model of competition among spatially diﬀerentiated ﬁrms and in-
troduce a GMM estimator that recovers the structural parameters with only regional-
level data. We apply the model and estimator to the portland cement industry. The
estimation ﬁts, both in-sample and out-of-sample, demonstrate that the framework
explains well the salient features of competition. We estimate transportation costs to
be $0.30 per tonne-mile, given diesel prices at the 2000 level, and show that these
costs constrain shipping distances and provide ﬁrms with localized market power. To
demonstrate policy-relevance, we conduct counter-factual simulations that quantify
competitive harm from a hypothetical merger. We are able to map the distribution of
harm over geographic space and identify the divestiture that best mitigates harm.1 Introduction
Geography is understudied in the empirical literature of industrial organization. Although
the theoretical literature has established that the physical distances between ﬁrms and con-
sumers have ﬁrst-order implications for competitive outcomes whenever transportation costs
are large (e.g., Hotelling (1929), d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), Salop (1979),
Thisse and Vives (1988), Economides (1989), Vogel (2008)), the complexities associated with
modeling spatial diﬀerentiation have made it diﬃcult to translate theoretical insights into
workable empirical models.1
Standard empirical methodologies simply sidestep spatial diﬀerentiation through the
delineation of distinct geographic markets. This simpliﬁes estimation but requires the dual
assumptions that (1) transportation costs are suﬃciently large to preclude substantive com-
petition across market boundaries, and (2) transportation costs are suﬃciently small that
spatial diﬀerentiation is negligible within markets. It can be diﬃcult to meet both condi-
tions.2 In practice, markets are often based on political borders of questionable economic
signiﬁcance (e.g., state or county lines). Nonetheless, market delineation is employed rou-
tinely in studies of industries characterized by high transportation costs, including ready-mix
concrete (e.g., Syverson (2004), Syverson and Horta¸ csu (2007), Collard-Wexler (2009)), port-
land cement (e.g., Salvo (2008), Ryan (2009)), and paper (e.g., Pesendorfer (2003)).3
Our purpose is to introduce an alternative empirical framework. To that end, we
develop and estimate a structural model of competition among spatially diﬀerentiated ﬁrms
that accounts for transportation costs in a realistic and tractable manner. We focus on
production and consumption within a two dimensional Euclidean space, which we refer to
informally as a geographic space. Competition involves a discrete number of plants, each
endowed with a physical location, and a continuum of consumers that spans the space. Each
plant sets a distinct price to each consumer, taking into consideration its proximity to the
consumer and the proximities of its competitors. Thus, plants discriminate between elastic
and inelastic consumers based on the pre-determined plant and consumer locations, and the
model resembles the theoretical work of Thisse and Vives (1988). Competitive outcomes
depend on the magnitude of transportation costs and the degree of spatial diﬀerentiation
1Surely it would be too strong to claim that, in empirical industrial organization, space is the ﬁnal frontier.
2Syverson (2004) discusses how this tension can compel researchers to seek compromise between markets
that are “too small” and markets that are “too large”. It is sometimes argued that markets that are too large
may overstate the intensity of competition while markets that are too small may understate competition.
3These valuable contributions focus on wide range of topics, including the competitive impacts of hor-
izontal and vertical mergers, heterogeneity in plant productivity and its implications for competition, the
inference of market power, and dynamic investment decisions.within the geographic space.
We discretize the geographic space into small “consumer areas” to operationalize the
model. Since each plant may ship to each consumer area, the model diverges starkly from
more conventional approaches in which plants do not compete across market boundaries.
We employ standard diﬀerentiated-product methods to model competition within consumer
areas. On the supply side, domestic plants compete in prices given capacity constraints and
the existence of a competitive fringe of foreign importers. On the demand side, consumers
select the plant that maximizes utility, taking into consideration their proximity to the plants,
the plant prices, and a nested logit error term. To be clear, the plants are diﬀerentiated
primarily by price and location – we assume that the product itself is homogeneous. We
derive an equation that characterizes the equilibrium price and market share for each plant-
area pair as a function of data and parameters.4
The central challenge for estimation is that prices and market shares are unobserved
in the data, at least at the plant-area level. We develop a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator that exploits variation in data that are more often observed: regional
level consumption, production, and prices. The key insight is that each candidate parameter
vector corresponds to an equilibrium set of plant-area prices and market shares. We compute
numerical equilibrium for each candidate parameter vector using a large-scale nonlinear
equation solver developed in La Cruz, Mart´ ınez, and Raydan (2006). We then aggregate the
predictions of the model to the regional level and evaluate the distance between the data
and the predictions. The estimator can be interpreted as having inner and outer loops: the
outer loop minimizes an objective function over the parameter space while the inner loop
computes numerical equilibrium for each candidate parameter vector. We show that the
estimator consistently recovers the structural parameters of the data generating process in
an artiﬁcial data experiment.
We apply the model and the estimator to the portland cement industry in the U.S.
Southwest over the period 1983-2003. The choice of industry conveys at least three sub-
stantive advantages to the analysis. First, transportation costs contribute substantially to
overall consumer costs because portland cement is inexpensive relative to its weight. Second,
it may be reasonable to treat portland cement as a homogenous product because strict in-
dustry standards govern the production process.5 This conformity matches the simplicity of
4We refer to the fraction of potential demand in a consumer area that is captured by a given plant as the
“market share” of the plant. We select the term purely for expositional convenience. We do not argue that
consumer areas reﬂect antitrust markets in any sense; indeed, a deﬁning characteristic of the model is that
it avoids market delineation entirely.
5Many plants produce a number of diﬀerent types of portland cement, each with slightly diﬀerent spec-
2the demand system, in which spatial considerations (e.g., plant and consumer locations) are
the main source of plant heterogeneity. Third, high quality data on the industry are publicly
available. We obtain information on regional consumption, production, and average prices,
as well as limited information on cross-region shipments, from annual publications of the
United States Geological Survey. We pair these regional-level metrics with information on
the location and characteristics of portland cement plants from publications of the Portland
Cement Association. We exploit variation in these data to estimate the model.
The results of estimation suggest that consumers pay roughly $0.30 per tonne-mile,
given diesel prices at the 2000 level.6 Given the shipping distances that arise in numerical
equilibrium, this translates into an average transportation cost of $24.61 per metric tonne
over the sample period – suﬃcient to account for 22 percent of total consumer expenditure.
Costs of this magnitude have real eﬀects on competition in the industry. We focus on two
such eﬀects: First, transportation costs constrain the distance that cement can be shipped
economically. The results indicate that cement is shipped only 92 miles on average between
the plant and the consumer; by contrast, a counter-factual simulation suggests that the
average shipment would be 276 miles absent transportation costs. Second, transportation
costs insulate ﬁrms from competition and provide localized market power. For instance,
the prices that characterize numerical equilibrium decrease systematically in the distance
between the plant and the consumer, as do the corresponding market shares.7
The estimation procedure produces impressive in-sample and out-of-sample ﬁts despite
parsimonious demand and marginal cost speciﬁcations. The model predictions explain 93
percent of the variation in regional consumption, 94 percent of the variation in regional
production, and 82 percent of the variation in regional prices. The model predictions also
explain 98 percent of the variation in cross-region shipments, even though we withhold the
bulk of these data from estimation. As we detail in an appendix, the quality of these ﬁts
is underscored by the rich time-series variation in these data. Together, the regression ﬁts
suggest that a small quantity of exogenous data, properly utilized, may be suﬃcient to
explain some of the most salient features of competition in the portland cement industry.
We interpret this as substantial support for the power of the analytical framework.
iﬁcations and characteristics (e.g., superior early strength or higher sulfate resistance). These products are
close substitutes for most construction projects.
6Strictly speaking, the model identiﬁes consumer willingness-to-pay for proximity to the plant, which in-
corporates transportation costs as well as any other distance-related costs (e.g., reduced reliability). We refer
to this willingness-to-pay as the transportation cost, although the concepts may not be precisely equivalent.
7These patterns are precisely what economic theory would predict given that consumers pay the costs of
transportation in the portland cement industry.
3We suspect that our method may prove useful for future research and policy endeavors
relating to international trade, environmental economics, and industrial organization. One
such application is merger simulation, an important tool for competition policy. We use
counter-factual simulations to evaluate the eﬀects of a hypothetical merger between two
multi-plant cement ﬁrms in 1986. We ﬁnd that the merger reduces consumer surplus by $1.4
million if no divestitures are made, and we are able to map the distribution of this harm over
the U.S. Southwest. The overall magnitude of the eﬀect is modest relative to the amount
of commerce – by way of comparison, we calculate total pre-merger consumer surplus to be
more than $239 million. We then consider the six possible single-plant divestitures, and ﬁnd
that the most powerful reduces consumer harm by 56 percent.8
At least two caveats are important. First, the estimation procedure rests on the unique-
ness of equilibrium at each candidate parameter vector, but there is no theoretical reason to
expect this condition to hold generally. To assess the issue, we conduct a Monte Carlo exper-
iment that computes numerical equilibrium using several diﬀerent starting points for each of
6,300 randomly drawn candidate parameter vectors. The results are strongly supportive of
uniqueness, at least in our application (see the appendices for details). Second, the promise
of spatial diﬀerentiation creates incentives for ﬁrms to locate optimally in order to secure a
base of proﬁtable customers, provide separation from an eﬃcient competitor, and/or deter
nearby entry. We abstract from these considerations entirely and instead assume that ﬁrm
location is pre-determined and exogenous. Nonetheless, our framework could help deﬁne
stage-game payoﬀs in more dynamic models that endogenize ﬁrm location choices (e.g., as
in Seim (2006) and Aguirregabiria and Vicentini (2006)).
Our work builds on recent contributions to the industrial organization literature that
model competition among spatially diﬀerentiated retail ﬁrms (e.g., Thomadsen (2005), Davis
(2006), McManus (2009)). These papers employ a framework in which each ﬁrm sets a
single price to all consumers, consistent with practice in most retail settings, and recover the
structural parameters with ﬁrm-level data and more standard estimation techniques (e.g.,
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)).9 We make two distinct contributions to this literature.
First, our model extends the existing framework to incorporate ﬁrms that price discriminate
8We refer to the divesture plan that oﬀsets the greatest amount of consumer harm among the set of single-
plant divestitures as the most powerful. We do not attempt to characterize, in any way, the appropriate
course of action for an antitrust authority.
9Thomadsen (2005) may be the closest antecedent to our work. Thomadsen shows that a supply-side
equilibrium condition can be substituted for ﬁrm-level market shares in estimation. We develop the potency
of equilibrium conditions more fully: given an equilibrium condition and aggregate data, estimation is feasible
with neither ﬁrm-level prices nor ﬁrm-level market shares. Aguirregabiria and Vicentini (2006) develop a
sophisticated model of spatial diﬀerentiation but do not take the model to data.
4among consumers. In such a setting, ﬁrm-level data are no longer suﬃcient to support
standard estimation techniques. Thus, our second contribution is the demonstration that
estimation is feasible with relatively aggregated data. Of course, the regional-level data we
use in our application would also support estimation in simpler retail settings.
More generally, our results indicate that ﬁrm-level heterogeneity can aﬀect competi-
tive outcomes even when the product is relatively homogenous. Reﬁnements to the stan-
dard toolbox available for structural research in these settings have been outstripped in
empirical industrial organization by models of observed and (especially) unobserved product
heterogeneity. We suspect that models of competition for homogenous-product industries
are currently of heightened value, not only because of the imbalance in the literature, but
also because these industries provide fertile testing grounds for methodological innovations
regarding industry dynamics (e.g., as in Ryan (2009)). We hope that the framework we
introduce helps, incrementally, to redirect the attention of researchers to these settings.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the relevant institutional details
of the portland cement industry, focusing on transportation costs, production technology,
and trends in production and consumption. We develop the empirical model of Bertrand-
Nash competition in Section 3 and discuss our data sources in Section 4. Then, in Section 5,
we develop the estimator and provide identiﬁcation arguments. We present the estimation
results in Section 6, discuss the merger simulations in Section 7, and then conclude.
2 The Portland Cement Industry
Portland cement is a ﬁnely ground dust that forms concrete when mixed with water and
coarse aggregates such as sand and stone. Concrete is an essential input to many construction
and transportation projects, either as pourable ﬁll material or as pre-formed concrete blocks,
because its local availability and lower maintenance costs make it more economical than
substitutes such as steel, asphalt, and lumber (e.g., Van Oss and Padovani (2002)).10
Most portland cement is shipped by truck to ready-mix concrete plants or construction
sites, in accordance with contracts negotiated between individual purchasers and plants.11
Transportation costs contribute substantially to overall consumer expenditures because port-
10We draw heavily from the publicly available documents and publications of the United States Geological
Survey and the Portland Cement Association to support the analysis in this section. We defer detailed
discussion of these sources for expositional convenience.
11A smaller portion is shipped by train or barge to terminals, and only then distributed to consumers by
truck. Shipment via terminals reduces transportation costs for more distant consumers. Roughly 23 percent
of portland cement produced in the United States was shipped through terminals in 2003.
5land cement is inexpensive relative to its weight, a fact that is well understood in the aca-
demic literature. For example, Scherer et al (1975) estimates that transportation would have
accounted for roughly one-third of total consumer expenditures on a hypothetical 350-mile
route between Chicago and Cleveland, and a 1977 Census Bureau study determines that
most portland cement is consumed locally – for example, more than 80 percent is trans-
ported within 200 miles.12 More recently, Salvo (2010) presents evidence consistent with the
importance of transportation costs in the Brazilian portland cement industry.
A recent report prepared for the Environmental Protection Agency identiﬁes ﬁve main
variable input costs of production: raw materials, coal, electricity, labor, and kiln mainte-
nance (EPA (2009)). In the production process itself, a feed mix composed of limestone and
supplementary materials is fed into large rotary kilns that reach temperatures of 1400-1450◦
Celsius. The combustion of coal is the most eﬃcient way to generate this extreme heat.
Kilns generally operate at peak capacity with the exception of an annual shutdown period
for maintenance. It is possible to adjust output by extending or shortening the maintenance
period – for example, plants may simply forego maintenance at the risk of kiln damage
and/or breakdowns. The feed mix exits the kiln as semi-fused clinker modules. Once cooled,
the clinker is mixed with a small amount of gypsum, placed into a grinding mill, and ground
into tiny particles averaging ten micrometers in diameter. This product – portland cement
– is shipped to purchasers either in bulk or packaged in smaller bags.
We focus on the production and consumption of portland cement in the U.S. Southwest
– by which we mean California, Arizona and Nevada – over the period 1983-2003. This region
accounts for roughly 15 percent of domestic portland cement production and consumption
during the sample period. Figure 1 provides a map of the region based on the plant locations
in the ﬁnal year of the sample. As shown, most plants are located along an interstate
highway and nearby one or more population centers. Although some ﬁrms own more than
one plant, production capacity in the area is not particularly concentrated – the capacity-
based Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 1260 is well below the threshold level that
deﬁnes highly concentrated markets in the 1992 Merger Guidelines. The plants also face
competition from foreign importers that ship portland cement through the customs oﬃces of
San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Nogales. Still, transportation costs may insulate
some plants from both foreign and domestic competition.13
12Scherer et al (1975) examined more than 100 commodities and determined that the transportation costs
of portland cement were second only to those of industrial gases. Other commodities identiﬁed as having
particularly high transportation costs include concrete, petroleum reﬁning, alkalies/chlorine, and gypsum.
13We observe little entry and exit over the sample period. The sole entrant (Royal Cement) began opera-


















































Figure 1: Portland Cement Production Capacity in the U.S. Southwest circa 2003.
In Figure 2, we plot total consumption and production in the U.S. Southwest over the
sample period, together with two measures of foreign imports. Several patterns are appar-
ent. Both consumption and production increase over 1983-2003, and both metrics are highly
cyclical. However, consumption is more cyclical than production, so that the gap between
consumption and production increases in overall activity; foreign importers provide addi-
tional supply whenever domestic demand outstrips domestic capacity. Strikingly, observed
foreign imports are nearly identical to “apparent imports,” which we deﬁne as consumption
minus production, consistent with negligible net trade between the U.S. Southwest and other
domestic areas. Finally, we note that the average free-on-board price charged by domestic
plants in the region (not shown) falls over the sample period from $107 per metric tonne to
$74 per metric tonne, primarily due to lower coal and electricity costs.14
of plant construction, as documented in Ryan (2009). Plant ownership is somewhat more ﬂuid; we observe
fourteen changes in plant ownership, spread among nine of the sixteen plants.
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Figure 2: Consumption, Production, and Imports of Portland Cement. Apparent imports are deﬁned as
consumption minus production. Observed imports are total foreign imports shipped into San Francisco, Los
Angeles, San Diego, and Nogales.
3 Empirical Model
3.1 Overview
We develop a structural model of competition that accounts for transportation costs in a
realistic and tractable manner. We focus on production and consumption within a single
geographic space. Competition involves a discrete number of plants, each endowed with a
physical location, and a continuum of consumers that spans the space. Each plant sets a
distinct price to each consumer, taking into consideration its proximity to the consumer and
the proximities of its competitors. To operationalize the model, we discretize the geographic
space into small consumer areas. We employ standard techniques to model competition
within consumer areas: plants charge area-speciﬁc prices subject to exogenous capacity
constraints, and consumer demand is nested logit. We derive an equation that characterizes
the equilibrium price and market share for each plant-area pair.
3.2 Supply
We take as given that there are F ﬁrms, each of which operates some subset ℑf of the
J plants. Each plant is endowed with a set of attributes, including a physical location.
Consumers exist in N diﬀerent areas that span the geographic space. Every plant can ship















      
variable costs
, (1)
where Qjn and Pjn are the quantity and price, respectively, of plant j in area n, MCj is
the marginal cost of production, and Qj is total plant production (i.e., Qj =
∑
n Qjn). The
vectors c and d include the supply and demand parameters, respectively, and together
form the joint parameter vector  = (c,d).
The marginal cost function can accommodate most forms of scale economies or disec-
onomies. We choose a functional form that captures the plant-level capacity constraints that
are important for portland cement production. In particular, we let marginal costs increase















where wj is a vector that includes the relevant marginal cost shifters and CAPj is the
maximum quantity that plant j can produce. The parameter ν is the utilization threshold
above which marginal costs increase in production, the parameter ϕ determines the curvature
of the marginal cost function when utilization exceeds ν, and the combination γ(1 − ν)ϕ
represents the marginal cost penalty associated with production at capacity. The marginal
cost function is continuously diﬀerentiable in production for ϕ > 1. The vector of cost
parameters is c = (,γ,ν,ϕ).
We let the domestic ﬁrms compete against a competitive fringe of foreign importers,
which we denote as plant J +1. We assume that the fringe is a non-strategic actor and that
import prices are exogenously set based on some marginal cost common to all importers. The
fringe is endowed with one or more geographic locations and ships into every consumer area.
It sets a single price across all consumer areas (i.e., the fringe does not price discriminate),
consistent with perfect competition among importers.
3.3 Demand
We specify a nested logit demand system that captures the two most important character-
istics that diﬀerentiate portland cement plants: price and location. To that end, we assume
9that each area features many potential consumers. Each consumer either purchases cement
from one of the domestic plants or the importer, or foregoes a purchase of portland cement
altogether. We refer to the domestic plants and the importer as the inside goods, and refer to
the option to forego a purchase as the outside good. We place the inside goods in a separate
nest from the outside good.
We express the indirect utility that consumer i receives from plant j as a function of
the relevant plant and location observables:
uij = β0 + x
′
jn + ζi + λϵij, (3)
where the vector xjn includes the price of cement and the distance between the plant and
the area, as well as other plant-speciﬁc demand shifters. The idiosyncratic portion of the
indirect utility function is composed of consumer-speciﬁc shocks to the desirability of the
inside good (ζi) and the desirability of each plant (ϵit). We assume that the combination
ζi+λϵij has an extreme value distribution in which the parameter λ characterizes the extent
to which valuations of the inside good are correlated across consumers.15 We normalize the
mean utility of the outside good to zero, so that the indirect utility associated with foregoing
cement purchase is ui0 = ϵi0, with ϵi0 also having the extreme value distribution. The vector
of demand parameters is d = (β0,,λ).16
The nested logit structure yields an analytical expression for the market shares captured
by each plant. The market shares are speciﬁc to each plant-area pair because the relative
desirability of each plant varies across areas:
Sjn(P n;d) =
exp(β0 + λIn)














value of the inside goods. The ﬁrst factor in this expression is the marginal probability
that a consumer in area n selects an inside good, and the second factor is the conditional
probability that the consumer purchases from plant j given selection of an inside good. Both
15Cardell (1997) derives the conditions under which the speciﬁed taste shocks produce the extreme value
distribution. Tastes are perfectly correlated if λ = 0 and tastes are uncorrelated if λ = 1. In the latter case
the model collapses to a standard logit.
16We exclude product characteristics from the speciﬁcation because portland cement is a homogenous good,
at least to a ﬁrst approximation. It may be desirable to control for observed product characteristics in other
applications. (Though the presence of unobserved characteristics would pose a challenge to the estimation
procedure.) Also, we assume that consumers pay the cost of transportation, consistent with practice in the
cement industry. One could alternatively incorporate distance into the marginal cost function.
10take familiar logit forms due to the distributional assumptions on idiosyncratic consumer
tastes. The demand system maps cleanly into supply: the quantity sold by plant j to area
n is Qjn = SjnMn, where Mn is the potential demand of area n.17
3.4 Equilibrium











Since each plant competes in every consumer area and may price diﬀerently across areas,
there are J × N ﬁrst-order conditions. For notational convenience, we deﬁne the block-
diagonal matrix Ω(P) as the combination of n = 1,...,N sub-matrices, each of dimension






∂Pkn if j and k have the same owner
0 otherwise,
(6)
where the demand derivatives take the nested logit forms. Thus, the elements of each sub-
matrix Ωn
jk(P) characterize substitution patterns within area n, and the matrix Ω(P) has
a block diagonal structure because prices in one area do not aﬀect demand in other areas.
We can now stack the ﬁrst-order conditions:
P = MC(P) − Ω(P)
−1Q(P), (7)
where P, MC(P), and Q(P) are vectors of prices, marginal costs and quantities, re-
spectively. Provided that marginal cost parameter ϕ exceeds one, the mappings MC(P),
Ω(P), and Q(P) are each continuously diﬀerentiable. Further, the price vector belongs
to a compact set in which each price is (1) greater or equal to the corresponding marginal
cost, and (2) smaller than or equal to the price a monopolist would charge to the relevant
17The substitution patterns between cement plants are characterized by the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) within the inside good nest. We argue that IIA is a reasonable approximation for our
application. Portland cement is purchased nearly exclusively by ready-mix concrete plants and other con-
struction companies. These ﬁrms employ similar production technologies and compete under comparable
demand conditions. We are therefore skeptical that meaningful heterogeneity exists in consumer preferences
for plant observables (e.g., price and distance). Without such heterogeneity, the IIA property arises quite
naturally – for example, the random coeﬃcient logit demand model collapses to standard logit when the
distribution of consumer preferences is degenerate.
11area. Therefore, by Brower’s ﬁxed-point theorem, Bertrand-Nash equilibrium exists and is
characterized by the price vector P  that solves Equation 7.18
Spatial price discrimination is at the core of the ﬁrm’s pricing problem: ﬁrms maxi-
mize proﬁts by charging higher prices to nearby consumers and consumers without a close
alternative. Aside from price discrimination, the ﬁrm’s pricing problem follows standard
intuition. For example, a ﬁrm that contemplates a higher price for cement from plant j to
area n must evaluate a number of eﬀects: (1) the tradeoﬀ between lost sales to marginal
consumers and greater revenue from inframarginal consumers; (2) whether the ﬁrm would
recapture lost sales with its other plants; and (3) whether the lost sales would ease capacity
constraints and make the plant more competitive in other consumer areas.
4 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
4.1 Data sources
We cull the bulk of our data from the Minerals Yearbook, an annual publication of the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS). The Minerals Yearbook is based on an annual census of portland
cement plant and contains regional-level information on portland cement consumption, pro-
duction, and free-on-board prices.19 The four relevant regions include Northern California,
Southern California, Arizona, and Nevada. We observe annual consumption in each region
over the period 1983-2003. The USGS combines the Arizona and Nevada regions when re-
porting production and prices over 1983-1991, and no usable production or price information
is available for Nevada over 1992-2003.20 The Minerals Yearbook also includes information
on the price and quantity of portland cement that is imported into the U.S. Southwest via
the customs oﬃces in San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Nogales.
We also make use of more limited data on cross-region shipments from the California
18The existence proof follows Aguirregabiria and Vicentini (2006). Multiple equilibria may exist.
19The census response rate is typically well over 90 percent (e.g., 95 percent in 2003), and USGS staﬀ
imputes missing values for the few non-respondents based on historical and cross-sectional information.
Other academic studies that feature these data include McBride (1983), Rosenbaum and Reading (1988),
Rosenbaum (1994), Jans and Rosenbaum (1997), Ryan (2009), and Syverson and Horta¸ csu (2007). The
Minerals Yearbook provides the average free-on-board price charged the plants located in each region, rather
than the price paid by the consumers in each region.
20The USGS combines Nevada with Idaho, Montana and Utah starting in 1992. We adjust the Arizona
data to remove the inﬂuence of a single plant located in New Mexico whose production is aggregated into the
region. We detail this adjustment in an appendix. Also, it is worth noting that the USGS does not intend
for its regions to approximate geographic markets. Rather, the regions are delineated such that plant-level
information cannot be backward-engineered from the Minerals Yearbook.
12Letter, a second annual publication of the USGS. The California Letter provides information
on the quantity of portland cement that is shipped from plants in California to consumers in
Northern California, Southern California, Arizona, and Nevada. However, the level of aggre-
gation varies over the sample period, some data are redacted to protect sensitive information,
and no information is available before 1990. In total, we observe 96 data points:
• CA to N. CA over 1990-2003
• CA to S. CA over 2000-2003
• CA to AZ over 1990-2003
• CA to NV over 2000-2003
• N. CA to N. CA over 1990-1999
• S. CA to N. CA over 1990-1999
• S. CA to S. CA over 1990-1999
• S. CA to AZ over 1990-1999
• S. CA to NV over 1990-1999
• N. CA to AZ over 1990-1999.
We withhold the bulk of these data from the estimation procedure and instead use the data
to conduct out-of-sample checks on the model predictions.21
We supplement the USGS data with basic plant-level information from the Plant In-
formation Survey (PIS), an annual publication of the Portland Cement Association. The
PIS provides the location of each portland cement plant in the United States, together with
its owner, the annual kiln capacity, and various other kiln characteristics.22 We approximate
consumer areas using counties, which meet the criterion of being small relative to the overall
geographic space – there are 90 counties in the U.S. Southwest. We collect county-level data
from the Census Bureau on construction employment and residential construction permits
to account for county-level heterogeneity in potential demand. Finally, we collect data on
diesel, coal, and electricity prices from the Energy Information Agency, data on average
wages of durable good manufacturing employees from the BEA, and data on crushed stone
prices from the USGS; we exploit state-level variation for all but the diesel data.
21The California Letter is based on a monthly survey rather than on the annual USGS census. As a result,
the data are not always consistent with the Minerals Yearbook. We normalize the data prior to estimation
so that total shipments equal total production in each year.
22We multiply kiln capacity by 1.05 to approximate cement capacity, consistent with the industry practice
of mixing clinker with a small amount of gypsum (typically 3 to 7 percent) in the grinding mills.
134.2 Summary statistics
We provide summary statistics on consumption, production, and prices for each of the regions
in Table 1. Some patterns stand out: First, substantial variation in each metric is available,
both inter-temporally and across regions, to support estimation. Second, Southern Califor-
nia is larger than the other regions, whether measured by consumption or production. Third,
consumption exceeds production in Northern California, Arizona, and Nevada; these short-
falls must be countered by cross-region shipments and/or imports. The observation that
plants in these regions charge higher prices is consistent with transportation costs providing
some degree of local market power.23 Finally, imports are less expensive than domestically
produced portland cement. This discrepancy may exist in part because the reported prices
exclude duties; more speculatively, domestic producers may be more reliable or may maintain
relationships with consumers that support higher prices.
In Table 2, we explore the spatial characteristics of the regions in more depth, based on
the plant locations of 2003. First, the average county in Northern California is 65 miles from
the nearest domestic cement plant. Since the comparable statistics for Southern California,
Arizona, and Nevada are 72 miles, 92 miles, and 100 miles, respectively, one may infer that
average transportation costs may diﬀer substantively across the four regions. Second, the
average additional distance to the second closest domestic plant is 44 miles in Northern
California, 11 miles in Southern California, 82 miles in Arizona, and 77 miles in Nevada,
suggestive that plants in Arizona and Nevada may hold more local market power than plants
elsewhere. Finally, the average distance to the nearest customs oﬃce is 123 miles in Northern
California, 110 miles in Southern California, 181 miles in Arizona, and 281 miles in Nevada,
suggestive that imports may constrain domestic prices less severely in Arizona and Nevada.




The challenge for estimation is that prices and market shares are unobserved in the data, at
least at the plant-area level. We develop a GMM estimator that exploits variation in data
23The data on cross-region shipments are also suggestive of large transportation costs. For example, more
than 90 percent of portland cement produced in Northern California was shipped to consumers in Northern
California over 1990-1999.
14Table 1: Consumption, Production, and Prices
Description Mean Std Min Max
Consumption
Northern California 3,513 718 2,366 4,706
Southern California 6,464 1,324 4,016 8,574
Arizona 2,353 650 1,492 3,608
Nevada 1,289 563 416 2,206
Production
Northern California 2,548 230 1,927 2,894
Southern California 6,316 860 4,886 8,437
Arizona-Nevada 1,669 287 1050 2,337
Domestic Prices
Northern California 85.81 11.71 67.43 108.68
Southern California 82.81 16.39 62.21 114.64
Arizona-Nevada 92.92 14.24 75.06 124.60
Import Prices
U.S. Southwest 50.78 9.30 39.39 79.32
Statistics are based on observations at the region-year level over
the period 1983-2003. Production and consumption are in thou-
sands of metric tonnes. Prices are per metric tonne, in real
2000 dollars. Import prices exclude duties. The region labeled
“Arizona-Nevada” incorporates information from Nevada plants
only over 1983-1991.
15Table 2: Distances between Counties and Plants
Description Mean Std Min Max
Miles to the closest plant
Northern California 64.65 30.00 7.36 115.39
Southern California 72.28 39.74 18.58 127.46
Arizona 91.62 40.01 29.13 163.99
Nevada 100.04 61.97 17.38 232.03
Additional miles to the second closest plant
Northern California 43.95 49.84 0.49 176.07
Southern California 11.22 8.83 0.49 31.08
Arizona 81.96 55.65 0.69 172.38
Nevada 77.38 43.28 12.82 177.20
Miles to the closest import point
Northern California 122.65 67.42 4.33 283.00
Southern California 110.17 67.43 30.29 221.28
Arizona 180.80 90.26 14.07 314.91
Nevada 281.45 81.93 170.09 442.02
Distances are calculated based on plant locations in 2003. There
are 46 counties in Northern California, 12 counties in Southern
California, 15 counties in Arizona, and 17 counties in Nevada.
16that are more often observed: regional level consumption, production, and prices. The key
insight is that each candidate parameter vector corresponds to an equilibrium set of plant-
area prices and market shares. We compute equilibrium numerically for each candidate
parameter vector, aggregate predictions of the model to the regional-level, and then evaluate
the “distance” between the data and the aggregate predictions. The estimation routine is
an iterative procedure deﬁned by the following steps:
1. Select a candidate parameter vector   .
2. Compute the equilibrium price and market share vectors.
3. Calculate regional-level metrics based on the equilibrium vectors.
4. Evaluate the regional-level metrics against the data.
5. Update    and repeat steps 1-5 to convergence.
The estimation procedure can be interpreted as having both an inner loop and an outer loop:
the inner loop computes equilibrium for each candidate parameter vector and the outer loop
minimizes an objective function over the parameter space. We discuss the inner loop and
the outer loop in turn, and then address some additional details.
5.2 Computation of numerical equilibrium
We use a large-scale nonlinear equation solver developed in La Cruz, Mart´ ınez, and Ray-
dan (2006) to compute equilibrium. The equation solver employs a quasi-Newton method
and exploits simple derivative-free approximations to the Jacobian matrix; it converges
more quickly than other algorithms and does not sacriﬁce precision. We deﬁne a numer-
ical Bertrand-Nash equilibrium as a price vector for which ∥ (P) ∥ / dim((P)) < δ, where
∥ · ∥ denotes the Euclidean norm operator and
(P) = Ω(P)(P − MC(P)) − Q(P). (8)
We denote the equilibrium prices that correspond to the candidate parameter vector    as
  Pjnt(  ,), where  includes the exogenous data. We denote the corresponding equilibrium
market shares as   Sjnt(  ,). From a computational standpoint, our construction of (P)
avoids the burden of inverting Ω(P) that would be required by the straight application
of Equation 7. Further, the structure of the problem permits us to compute equilibrium
17separately for each period. The price vector that characterizes the equilibrium of a given
period has length Jt × N so that, for example, the equilibrium price vector for 2003 has
14 × 90 = 1,260 elements.24
The empirical analogs to the computed plant-area prices and market shares are not
observed in the data, so we aggregate the prices and market shares to construct more useful
regional metrics. For notational precision, we deﬁne the sets ℵr and ȷr as the counties and
plants, respectively, located in region r. The aggregated region-period metrics take the form:




1 −   S0nt(  ,)
)
Mnt
  Qrt(  ,) =
∑
j∈ȷr
  Sjnt(  ,)Mnt (9)









n   Sjnt(  ,)Mnt
  Pjnt(  ,),
where   Crt(  ,),   Qrt(  ,), and   Prt(  ,) are total consumption, total production, and
weighted-average price, respectively. We calculate regional consumption for each of the four
regions in the data – Northern California, Southern California, Arizona, and Nevada. We
calculate production and prices for Northern California, Southern California, and a combined
Arizona-Nevada region. We denote the empirical analogs Crt, Qrt, and Prt.
We ﬁnd that, in practice, we can better identify some of the model parameters by
exploiting information on aggregated cross-region shipments. We denote the quantity of
shipments from region r to region s as   Qs
rt(  ,). The shipments take the form:
  Q
s





  Sjnt(  ,)Mnt, (10)
We calculate the quantity of portland cement produced by plants in California (both North-
ern and Southern) that is shipped to consumers in Northern California. The empirical
analog, which we denote Qs
rt, is available over the period 1990-2003. We withhold data on
other cross-region shipments from estimation because the number of parameters that we es-
timate exceeds the lengths of the available time-series. The withheld data, however, provide
24We set δ =1e-13. Numerical error can propagate into the outer loop when the inner loop tolerance is
substantially looser (e.g., 1e-7), which slows overall estimation time and can produce poor estimates. The
inner loop tolerance is not unit free and must be evaluated relative to the price level. We also note that,
in settings characterized by constant marginal costs, one could ease the computational burden of the inner
loop by solving for equilibrium prices in each consumer area separately.
18natural out-of-sample tests on the model predictions.
5.3 Objective function
We estimate the parameters using the standard GMM framework for systems of nonlinear
regression equations (e.g., Greene (2003), page 369). The equations we use compare the
metrics computed in the inner loop to their empirical analogs:
Cr =   Cr(,) + e
1
r
Qr =   Qr(,) + e
2
r (11)










We write the equations in vector form with one element per period. There are four con-
sumption moments, three production moments, three price moments, and one cross-region
shipments moment. We have 21 observations on each of the consumption, production and
price moments, and 14 observations on the cross-region shipments moment. We interpret
the disturbances as measurement error, and assume the disturbances to have expectation
zero and contemporaneous covariance matrix Σ.
The GMM estimator is:




−1e(  ,), (12)
where e(  ,) is a vector of empirical disturbances obtained by stacking the nonlinear regres-
sion equations and A is a positive deﬁnite weighting matrix. We employ the usual two-step
procedure to obtain consistent and eﬃcient estimates (Hansen (1982)). We ﬁrst minimize the
objective function using A = I. We then estimate the contemporaneous covariance matrix
and minimize the objective function a second time using the weighting matrix A =   Σ ⊗ I.
We compute standard errors that are robust to both heteroscedasticity and arbitrary cor-
relations among the error terms of each period, using the methods of Hansen (1982) and
Newey and McFadden (1994).25
25Measurement error that is zero in expectation is suﬃcient for consistency. Estimation of the contem-
poraneous covariance matrix Σ is complicated by the fact that we observe consumption, production, and
prices over 1983-2003 but cross-region shipments over 1990-2003. We use methods developed in Srivastava
and Zaatar (1973) and Hwang (1990) to account for the unequal numbers of observations.
195.4 Potential demand
We normalize the potential demand of each county using two exogenous demand predictors
that we observe at the county level: the number of construction employees and the number
of new residential building permits. We regress regional portland cement consumption on
the demand predictors (aggregated to the regional level), impute predicted consumption at
the county level based on the estimated relationships, and then scale predicted consumption
by a constant of proportionality to obtain potential demand.26 The results indicate that
potential demand is concentrated in a small number of counties. In 2003, the largest 20
counties account for 90 percent of potential demand, the largest 10 counties account for
65 percent of potential demand, and the largest two counties – Maricopa County and Los
Angeles County – together account for nearly 25 percent of potential demand.27 In the
time-series, potential demand more than doubles over 1983-2003, due to greater activity in
the construction sector and the onset of the housing bubble.
5.5 The geographic space
Our restricted geographic focus eases the computational burden of the estimation routine.
For instance, a national sample would require the computation of more than 300 thousand
equilibrium plant-county prices in each time period, for every outer loop iteration. The geo-
graphical restriction is valid provided that gross domestic inﬂows/outﬂows are insubstantial.
The data provide some support. Most directly, the California Letter indicates that more
than 98 percent of cement produced in Southern California was shipped within the U.S.
Southwest over the period 1990-1999, and more than 99 percent of cement produced in Cali-
fornia (both Northern and Southern) was shipped within the U.S. Southwest over the period
2000-2003.28 We consider outﬂows from Arizona unlikely because the Minerals Yearbook
indicates that consumption routinely exceeds production in that state, and we consider out-
ﬂows from Nevada unlikely because production capacity is low relative to potential demand.
Since net domestic inﬂows/outﬂows are insubstantial (see Figure 2), these data patterns
26The regression of regional portland cement consumption on the demand predictors yields an R2 of
0.9786, which foreshadows an inelastic estimate of aggregate demand. Additional predictors, such as land
area, population, and percent change in gross domestic product, contribute little additional explanatory
power. We use a constant of proportionality of 1.4, which is suﬃcient to ensure that potential demand
exceeds observed consumption in each region-year observation.
27The largest ﬁve counties are Maricopa County (3,259 thousand metric tonnes), Los Angeles County
(3,128 thousand metric tonnes), Clark County (1,962 thousand metric tonnes), Riverside County (1,803
thousand metric tonnes) and San Diego County (1,733 thousand metric tonnes).
28Analogous statistics for Northern California over 1990-1999 are unavailable due to data redaction.
20suggest that gross inﬂows are also insubstantial.
5.6 Identiﬁcation
We use an artiﬁcial data experiment to test identiﬁcation. We draw 40 data sets, each with
21 time periods, using our model and a vector of “true” parameters as the data generating
process. We then seek to recover the parameter values with the GMM estimation procedure.
The exogenous data includes the plant capacities, the potential demand of counties, the diesel
price, the import price, and two cost shifters. We randomly draw capacity and potential
demand from the data (with replacement), and we draw the remaining data from normal
distributions.29 We hold plant and county locations ﬁxed to maintain tractability, and rely
on the random draws on capacity, potential demand, and diesel prices to create variation in
the distances between production capacity and consumers.
Table 3 shows the results of the experiment. Interpretation is complicated somewhat
because we use non-linear transformations to constrain the price and distance coeﬃcients
below zero, constrain the coeﬃcients on the cost shifters and the over-utilization cost above
zero, and constrain the inclusive value and utilization threshold coeﬃcients between zero
and one. We defer details on these transformations to Appendix C. As shown, the means
of the estimated coeﬃcients are close to (transformed) true parameters. The means of the
price and distance coeﬃcients, which are of particular interest, are within 6 percent and 11
percent of the truth, respectively. The root mean-squared errors tend to be between 0.45 and
0.66 – the two exceptions that generate higher mean-squared errors are the import dummy
and the over-utilization cost, which appear to be less cleanly identiﬁed.
To further build intuition, we explore some of the empirical relationships (graphed in
Figure 3) that drive parameter estimates in our application. On the demand side, the price
coeﬃcient is primarily identiﬁed by the relationship between the consumption and price mo-
ments. In panel A, we plot cement prices and the ratio of consumption to potential demand
(“market coverage”) over the sample period. The two metrics have a weak negative cor-
relation, consistent with downward-sloping but inelastic aggregate demand. The distance
coeﬃcient is primarily identiﬁed by (1) the cross-region shipments moment, and (2) the rela-
tionship between the consumption and production moments. To explore the second source of
identiﬁcation, we plot the gap between production and consumption (“excess production”)
for each region over the sample period. In many years, excess production is positive in
29Speciﬁcally, we use the following distributions: diesel price ∼ N(1,0.28), import price ∼ N(50,9), cost
shifter 1 ∼ N(60,15), and cost shifter 2 ∼ N(9,2). We redraw data that are below zero. We also redraw
data that lead the estimator to nonsensical areas of parameter space.
21Table 3: Artiﬁcial Data Test for Identiﬁcation
Variable Parameter Truth (θ) Transformed (  θ) Mean Est RMSE
Demand
Cement Price β1 -0.07 -2.66 -2.51 0.66
Miles×Diesel Price β2 -25.00 3.22 2.86 0.59
Import Dummy β3 -4.00 -4.00 -6.07 1.23
Intercept β0 2.00 2.00 1.11 0.51
Inclusive Value λ 0.09 -2.31 -1.73 0.54
Marginal Costs
Cost Shifter 1 α1 0.70 -0.36 -0.88 0.51
Cost Shifter 2 α2 3.00 1.10 0.54 0.45
Utilization Threshold ν 0.90 2.19 1.71 0.59
Over-Utilization Cost γ 300.00 5.70 6.14 1.05
Results of GMM estimation on 40 data sets that are randomly drawn based on the “true” parame-
ters listed. The parameters are transformed prior to estimation to place constraints on the parameter
signs/magnitudes (see Appendix C). Mean Est and RMSE are the mean of the estimated (transformed)
parameters and the root mean-squared error, respectively.
Southern California and negative elsewhere, consistent with inter-regional trade ﬂows. The
magnitude of these implied trade ﬂows helps drive the distance coeﬃcient. Interestingly, the
implied trade ﬂows are higher later in the sample, when the diesel fuel is less expensive.
On the supply side, the parameters on the marginal cost shifters are primarily identiﬁed
by the price moments. In panel C, we plot the coal price, the electricity price, the durable-
goods manufacturing wage, and the crushed stone price for California. Coal and electricity
prices are highly correlated with the cement price (e.g., see panel A), consistent with a
strong inﬂuence on marginal costs; inter-regional variation in input prices helps disentangle
the two eﬀects. It is less clear that wages and crushed stone prices are positively correlated
with cement prices. The utilization parameters are primarily identiﬁed by the relationship
between the production moments (which determine utilization) and the price moments. In
panel D, we plot cement prices and industry-wide utilization over the sample period. The two
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Figure 3: Empirical Relationships in the U.S. Southwest. Panel A plots average cement prices and market
coverage. Prices are in dollars per metric tonne and market coverage is deﬁned as the ratio of consumption
to potential demand (times 100). Panel B plots excess production in each region, which we deﬁne as the gap
between between production and consumption. Excess production is in millions of metric tonnes. Panel C
plots average coal prices, electricity prices, durable-goods manufacturing wages, and crushed stone prices in
California. For comparability, each time-series is converted to an index that equals one in 2000. Panel D
plots the average cement price and industry-wide utilization (times 100).
6 Estimation Results
6.1 Speciﬁcation and ﬁts
We estimate the model with parsimonious speciﬁcations of the utility and marginal cost
functions. Speciﬁcally, the utility speciﬁcation includes the plant-county price, the “distance”
between the plant and county, a dummy for the import option, and an intercept. We proxy
distance using a diesel price index interacted with the miles between the plant and the center
of the county (in thousands). The marginal cost speciﬁcation incorporates the ﬁve variable
inputs identiﬁed by EPA (2009). The constant portion of marginal costs includes shifters for
the price of coal, the price of electricity, the average wages of durable-goods manufacturing
employees, and the price of crushed stone. We let marginal costs increase in production
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Figure 4: GMM Estimation Fits for Regional Metrics. Consumption, production, and cross-region ship-
ments are in millions of metric tonnes. Prices are constructed as a weighted-average of plants in the region,
and are reported as dollars per metric tonne. The lines of best ﬁt and the reported R2 values are based on
univariate OLS regressions.
normalize ϕ = 1.5 to ensure the theoretical existence of equilibrium.
Before turning to the parameter estimates, we note that this speciﬁcation produces im-
pressive in-sample and out-of-sample ﬁts. In Figure 4, we plot observed consumption against
predicted consumption (panel A), observed production against predicted production (panel
B), and observed prices against predicted prices (panel C). The model explains 93 percent
of the variation in regional consumption, 94 percent of the variation in regional production,
and 82 percent of the variation in regional prices. The model also generates accurate out-
of-sample predictions. In panel D, we plot observations on cross-region shipments against
the corresponding model predictions. We use only 14 of these observations in the estimation
routine – the remaining 82 data points are withheld from the estimation procedure and do
not directly inﬂuence the estimated parameters. Even so, the model explains 98 percent of
the variation in these data.30
30We provide additional information on the estimation ﬁts in Appendix A.
24Table 4: Estimation Results
Variable Parameter Estimate St. Error
Demand
Cement Price β1 -0.087 0.002
Miles×Diesel Price β2 -26.42 1.78
Import Dummy β3 -3.80 0.06
Intercept β0 1.88 0.08
Inclusive Value λ 0.10 0.004
Marginal Costs
Coal Price α1 0.64 0.05
Electricity Price α2 2.28 0.47
Hourly Wages α3 0.01 0.04
Crushed Stone Price α4 0.29 0.31
Utilization Threshold ν 0.86 0.01
Over-Utilization Cost γ 233.91 38.16
GMM estimation results. Estimation exploits variation in regional con-
sumption, production, and average prices over the period 1983-2003,
as well as variation in shipments from California to Northern California
over the period 1990-2003. The prices of cement, coal, and crushed stone
are in dollars per metric tonne. Miles are in thousands. The diesel price
is an index that equals one in 2000. The price of electricity is in cents per
kilowatt-hour, and hourly wages are in dollars per hour. The marginal
cost parameter ϕ is normalized to 1.5, which ensures the theoretical ex-
istence of equilibrium. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity
and contemporaneous correlations between moments.
6.2 Demand estimates and transportation costs
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of the GMM procedure. The price and distance
coeﬃcients are the two primary objects of interest on the demand side; both are negative and
precisely estimated.31 The ratio of these coeﬃcients identiﬁes consumers’ willingness-to-pay
for proximity, incorporating transportation costs and any other distance-related costs (e.g.,
reduced reliability). In the following discussion, we refer to the willingness-to-pay as the
transportation cost, although the two concepts may not be strictly equivalent.
First, however, we brieﬂy summarize the implied price elasticities. We estimate that
31The other demand parameters take reasonable values and are precisely identiﬁed. The negative coeﬃcient
on the import dummy may be due to consumer preferences for domestic plants or to the fact that observed
import prices do not reﬂect the full price of imported cement (e.g., the data exclude duties). The inclusive
value coeﬃcient suggests that consumer tastes for the diﬀerent cement providers are highly correlated,
inconsistent with the standard (non-nested) logit model.
25the aggregate elasticity is -0.16 in the median year. This inelasticity is precisely what one
should expect based on economic theory and the fact that portland cement composes only
a small fraction of total construction expenses. Indeed, Syverson (2004) makes a similar
argument for ready-mix concrete, which accounts for only two percent of total construction
expenses according to the 1987 Benchmark Input-Output Tables. The cost share of portland
cement (an input to ready-mix concrete) is surely even lower. By contrast, we estimate that
the median ﬁrm-level elasticity is -5.70, consistent with substantive competition between
ﬁrms. Finally, we estimate that the domestic elasticity – which captures the responsiveness
of domestic demand to domestic prices, holding import prices constant – is -1.11 in the
median year. The discrepancy between the aggregate and domestic elasticities is suggestive
that imports have a disciplining eﬀect on domestic prices.
Returning to transportation costs, we estimate that consumers pay roughly $0.30 per
tonne mile, given diesel prices at the 2000 level.32 Given the shipping distances that arise
in numerical equilibrium, this translates into an average transportation cost of $24.61 per
metric tonne over the sample period – suﬃcient to account for 22 percent of total consumer
expenditure. Transportation costs of this magnitude have real eﬀects on the industry. We
develop two such eﬀects here: (1) transportation costs constrain the distance that cement
can be shipped economically; and (2) transportation costs insulate ﬁrms from competition
and provide some degree of localized market power.
In Figure 5, we plot the estimated distribution of the shipping distances over 1983-
2003. We calculate that portland cement is shipped an average of 92 miles, that 75 percent
of portland cement is shipped under 110 miles, and that 90 percent is shipped under 175
miles.33 To better place these numbers in context, we ask the question: “How far would
portland cement be shipped if transportation costs were negligible?” We perform a counter-
factual simulation in which we normalize the distance coeﬃcient to zero, keeping the other
coeﬃcients at their estimated values. The results suggest that, in an average year, port-
land cement would have been shipped on average 276 miles absent transportation costs.
Intriguingly, the ratio of actual miles shipped to this simulated measure provides a unit-free
measure that could enable cross-industry comparisons. The ratio in our application is 0.33.
We now develop the empirical evidence regarding localized market power. We start
with an illustrative example. Figure 6 shows the prices (Map A) and market shares (Map
B) that characterize numerical equilibrium for the Clarksdale plant in 2003, evaluated the
32The calculation is simply 26:42
0:087
index
1000 = 0.3037, where index = 1 in 2000.
33The average shipping distance ﬂuctuates between a minimum of 72 miles in 1983 and a maximum of 114
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Figure 5: The Estimated Distribution of Miles Shipped over 1983-2003.
optimized coeﬃcient vector. We mark the location of the Clarksdale plant with a star, and
mark other plants with circles. The Clarksdale plant captures more than 40 percent of the
market in the central and northeastern counties of Arizona. It charges consumers in these
counties its highest prices, typically $80 per metric tonne or more. Both market shares and
prices are lower in more distant counties, and in many counties the plant captures less than
one percent of demand despite substantial discounts. The locations of competitors may also
inﬂuence market share and prices, though these eﬀects are diﬃcult to discern on the map.
We explore these relationships more rigorously with regression analysis, based on the
prices and market shares that characterize equilibrium at the optimized coeﬃcient vector.
We regress price and market share on three independent variables: the distance between
the plant and the county, the distance between the county and the nearest other domestic
plant, and the estimated marginal cost of the plant. We deﬁne distance as miles times the
diesel index, and use a log-log speciﬁcation to ease interpretation. We focus on three data
samples, composed of the plant-county pairs with distances of 0-100, 100-200, and 200-300,
respectively. Our objective is purely descriptive and the regression coeﬃcients should not
be interpreted as consistent estimates of any underlying structural parameters.
Table 5 presents the results, which are consistent with the illustrative example and
demonstrate that (1) plants have higher prices and market shares in counties that are closer;
and (2) plants have lower prices and market shares in counties that have nearby alternatives.




































Figure 6: Equilibrium Prices and Market Shares for the Clarksdale Plant in 2003. The Clarksdale plant is
marked with a star, and other plants are marked with circles.
and market shares that are 0.9 percent and 14 percent higher, respectively. For the same
sample, a 10 percent reduction in the distance separating the county from its the closest
alternative is associated with prices and market shares that are 0.7 percent and 11 percent
lower, respectively. Interestingly, these price eﬀects attenuate for plants and counties that
are somewhat more distant, whereas the market share eﬀects amplify.
6.3 Marginal cost estimates
The marginal costs estimates shown in Table 4 correspond to a marginal cost of $69.40 in the
mean plant-year (weighted by production). Of these marginal costs, $60.50 is attributable
to costs related to coal, electricity, labor and raw materials, and the remaining $8.90 is
attributable to high utilization rates. In Figure 7, we plot the three metrics over 1983-
2003, together with the average prices that arise in numerical equilibrium at the optimized
parameter vector. The constant portion of marginal costs declines through the sample period,
due primarily to cheaper coal and electricity, whereas the utilization portion increases. We
estimate that utilization-related expenses account for roughly 25 percent of overall marginal
28Table 5: Plant Prices and Market Shares
Dependent Variable: ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Share) ln(Share) ln(Share)
Distance from Plant: 0-100 100-200 200-300 0-100 100-200 200-300
ln(Distance from Plant) -0.098* -0.038* -0.003 -1.369* -2.655* -5.902*
(0.026) (0.009) (0.009) (0.102) (0.186) (0.195)
ln(Distance to Nearest 0.071* 0.018* 0.007* 1.073* 0.813* 1.279*
Alternative) (0.019) (0.004) (0.002) (0.117) (0.081) (0.098)
ln(Marginal Cost) 0.723* 0.835* 0.841* -1.126* -2.057* -3.212*
(0.054) (0.014) (0.013) (0.304) (0.645) (0.874)
R2 0.7186 0.9209 0.9499 0.5278 0.4735 0.5407
# of Obs. 2,840 5,460 6,088 2,840 5,460 6,088
Results of OLS regression. The units of observation are at the plant-county-year level. The
dependent variables are the natural logs of the plant-county speciﬁc prices and market shares
that characterize numerical equilibrium at the GMM estimates. Distance from Plant is the miles
between the plant and county, times a diesel price index that equals one in 2000. Distance to
Nearest Alternative is the miles between the county and the nearest other domestic plant, times
the diesel price index. Marginal Cost is the marginal cost of the plant implied by the GMM
estimates. All regressions include an intercept. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity
and correlations among observations from the same plant. Statistical signiﬁcance at the one
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Figure 7: Estimated Marginal Costs and Average Prices.
costs over 1997-2003, during the onset of the housing bubble. Finally, we note that the
average markup (i.e., price minus marginal cost) is quite stable through the sample period
around its mean of $17.20.
We calculate that the average plant-year observation has variable costs of $51 million
by integrating the marginal cost function over the production levels that arise in numerical
equilibrium. Virtually all of these variable costs – 98.5 percent – are due to coal, electric-
ity, labor and raw materials, rather than due to high utilization. Thus, although capacity
constraints may have substantial aﬀects on marginal costs, the results suggest that their
cumulative contribution to plant costs can be minimal. Taking the accounting statistics
further, we calculate that the average plant-year has variable revenues of $73 million and
that the average gross margin (variable proﬁts over variable revenues) is 0.32. As argued in
Ryan (2009), margins of this magnitude may be needed to rationalize entry given the sunk
costs associated with plant construction.34,35
34These gross margins are consistent with publicly-available accounting data. For instance, Lafarge North
America – one of the largest domestic producers – reports an average gross margin of 0.33 over 2002-2004.
35Fixed costs are well understood to be important for production, as well. The trade journal Rock Prod-
ucts reports that high capacity portland cement plants incurred averaged $6.96 in maintenance costs per
production tonne in 1993 (Rock-Products (1994)). Evaluated at the production levels that correspond to
numerical equilibrium in 1993, this number implies that the average plant would have incurred $5.7 million
in maintenance costs relative to variable proﬁts of $17.7 million. The GMM estimation results suggest that
the bulk of these maintenance costs are best considered ﬁxed rather than due to high utilization rates. Of
course, the static nature of the model precludes more direct inferences about ﬁxed costs.
30Finally, we discuss the individual parameter estimates shown in Table 4, each of which
deviates somewhat from production data available from the Minerals Yearbooks and EPA
(2009). To start, the coal parameter implies that plants burn 0.64 tonnes of coal to produce
one tonne of cement, whereas in fact plants burn roughly 0.09 tonnes of coal to produce each
tonne of cement. The electricity parameter implies that plants use 228 kilowatt-hours per
tonne of cement, whereas the true number is closer to 150. Each tonne of cement requires
approximately 0.34 employee-hours yet the parameter on wages is essentially zero. Lastly, the
crushed stone coeﬃcient of 0.29 is too small, given that roughly 1.67 tonnes of raw materials
(mostly limestone) are used per tonne of cement. We suspect that these discrepancies are
due to measurement error in the data.36
6.4 A comparison to standard methods
The standard method of structural analysis for homogenous product industries assumes
independent markets and Cournot competition. In this section, we contrast some of our
results to those generated by the standard method in Ryan (2009), a recent paper that
estimates a structural model of the portland cement industry based on data from the Minerals
Yearbook and the Plant Information Summary. We focus on two economic concepts – the
aggregate elasticity of demand and the consequences of high utilization – for which our model
generates distinctly diﬀerent estimates than the standard method. These discrepancies do
not diminish the substantial contribution of Ryan (2009), which embeds the standard method
within an innovative dynamic discrete choice game and focuses primarily on the dynamic
parameters. Rather, the discrepancies suggest two reasons that our model may sometimes
provide more reasonable results than conventional approaches.
First, we estimate the aggregate elasticity of demand to be -0.16 in the median sample
year whereas Ryan works with an aggregate elasticity of -2.96, obtained from a constant
elasticity demand system. The diﬀerence is due to speciﬁc speciﬁcation choices – the constant
elasticity demand system produces an aggregate elasticity of -0.15 once housing permits are
included as a control.37 Ryan cannot use the inelastic estimate because, within the context
of Cournot competition, it implies ﬁrm elasticities that are small and inconsistent with proﬁt
36In particular, the coal prices in the data are free-on-board and do not reﬂect any transportation costs
paid by cement plants; cement plants may negotiate individual contracts with electrical utilities that are
not reﬂected in the data; the wages of cement workers need not track the average wages of durable-goods
manufacturing employees; and cement plants typically use limestone from a quarry adjacent to the plant, so
the crushed stone price may not proxy the cost of limestone acquisition (i.e., the quarry production costs).
37See Table 3 in Ryan (2009). We consider the inelastic estimate more plausible because portland cement
is a minor cost for most construction projects (see Section 6.2).
31maximization. This occurs because the Cournot model restricts each ﬁrm elasticity to be
linearly related to the aggregate elasticity according the relationship ej = e/sj, where ej,
e, and sj denote the ﬁrm elasticity, the aggregate elasticity, and the ﬁrm market shares,
respectively. This critique is fundamental: the standard method can be inappropriate for
intermediate goods, such as portland cement, that account for only a fraction for the total
production costs of the ﬁnal good. By contrast, the nested logit demand system divorces the
ﬁrm elasticities from the aggregate elasticity and, in our case, produces inelastic aggregate
demand and elastic ﬁrm demand.
Second, the two methods produce vastly diﬀerent estimates of the marginal cost curve
once utilization reaches the threshold level (which both methods place just above 0.85). We
estimate that marginal costs increase gradually so that full utilization increases marginal
costs by a total of $12.25 relative to utilization below the threshold. By contrast, Ryan
estimates that the slope of the marginal cost curve past the threshold is nearly inﬁnite.38
We suspect that the diﬀerence is data driven. The standard method requires data on ﬁrm-
level utilization. However, ﬁrm production is not available from the publicly-available data,
and Ryan imputes utilization as annual capacity divided by annualized daily capacity.
In Figure 8, we plot total production, total annual capacity, and total annualized daily
capacity in the U.S. Southwest over 1983-2003, together with total consumption. Both
production and consumption are pro-cyclical, and actual utilization (i.e., production over
annual capacity) varies substantively and predictably with demand conditions. By contrast,
annual capacity simply tracks annualized daily capacity so that Ryan’s utilization proxy is
uncorrelated with demand conditions. The strength of the relationship between utilization
and demand is precisely what identiﬁes the magnitude of utilization costs. Thus, we suspect
that the lower data requirements of our model – estimation is feasible when some variables
of interest (e.g., ﬁrm-level production) are unobserved – may improve economic estimates.
7 An application to competition policy
The model and estimator may prove useful for a variety of policy endeavors. One potential
application is merger simulation, an important tool for competition policy. In this subsection,
we use counter-factual simulations to evaluate a hypothetical merger between Calmat and
Giﬀord-Hill in 1986. During that year, Calmat and Giﬀord-Hill operated six plants and
accounted for 43 percent of industry capacity in the U.S. Southwest. We calculate the loss
38Our coeﬃcient γ is roughly analogous to Ryan’s δ2 coeﬃcient. We estimate γ to be 233.91, while Ryan
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Figure 8: Consumption, Production, and Two Capacity Measures.
of consumer surplus due to the unilateral eﬀects of the merger, map the distribution of harm
over the U.S. Southwest, and evaluate six alternative divestiture plans.39
Table 6 shows that the merger reduces consumer surplus by $1.40 million in 1986, absent
a divestiture. The magnitude of the eﬀect is modest relative to the amount of commerce; by
way of comparison, we calculate total pre-merger consumer surplus to be more than $239
million. We refer to the six plants available for divestiture as Calmat1, Calmat2, Calmat3,
Giﬀord-Hill1, Giﬀord-Hill2, and Giﬀord-Hill3, respectively. The single-plant divestitures
mitigate between 31 percent and 56 percent of the harm. The “optimal” divestiture – that
of Giﬀord-Hill2 – results in consumer harm of only $614 thousand.
We map the distribution of consumer harm over the U.S. Southwest in Figure 9, both
for the merger without divestiture (panel A) and under the optimal divestiture plan (panel
B). As shown in panel A, the unilateral eﬀects of the merger are concentrated in Southern
California and Arizona. Together, Maricopa County and Los Angeles County account for
39We follow standard practice to perform the counterfactuals. For each merger simulation, we deﬁne a
matrix Ωpost(P) using Equation 6 and the post-merger structure of the industry. We compute the equi-
librium post-merger price vector as the solution to Equation 7, substituting Ωpost(P) for Ω(P). Following
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n is the inclusive value of the inside goods calculated using equilibrium pre-merger prices, Ipost
n is
the inclusive value calculated using equilibrium post-merger prices, and β1 is the price coeﬃcient.
33Table 6: Divestitures and Consumer Surplus
Required Divestiture
None Calmat1 Calmat2 Calmat3 Giﬀord-Hill1 Giﬀord-Hill2 Giﬀord-Hill3
∆ Surplus -1,397 -964 -618 -797 -827 -614 -891
% Mitigated · 31% 56% 43% 41% 56% 36%
Results of counterfactual simulations. ∆ Surplus is the change in consumer surplus due to a hypo-
thetical merger between Calmat and Giﬀord-Hill in 1986, and is reported in thousands of 2000 dollars.
% Mitigated is calculated relative to the change in consumer surplus that occurs when no plant is
divested. We consider six single-plant divestiture plans, and refer to the diﬀerent plants as Calmat1,
















































Figure 9: Loss of Consumer Surplus Due to a Hypothetical Merger between Calmat and Giﬀord-Hill
60 percent of consumer harm, and more than 90 percent of consumer harm occurs only 10
counties. The best single-plant divestiture mitigates consumer harm in Southern California
but does little to reduce harm in Maricopa County (see panel B). The results of an additional
counterfactual exercises, in which we also divest one of the Arizona plants, suggest that a
two-plant divestiture can mitigate this harm as well (results not shown).
348 Conclusion
We develop a structural model of competition among spatially diﬀerentiated ﬁrms. The
model accounts for transportation costs in a realistic and tractable manner. We estimate the
model with relatively disaggregated data and recover the underlying structural parameters.
We argue that the model and estimator together provide an appealing framework with which
to evaluate competition in industries characterized by transportation costs and relatively
homogenous products. We apply the model and estimator to the portland cement industry
and demonstrate that (1) the framework explains the salient features of competition, (2) the
framework provides novel insights regarding transportation costs and spatial diﬀerentiation,
and (3) the framework could inform merger analysis and other competition policy endeavors.
Although the model is static, it could be utilized to deﬁne payoﬀs in more dynamic settings.
Such extensions could examine a number of research topics – such as entry deterrence and
product diﬀerentiation – that have been emphasized in the theoretical literature of industrial
organization since at least Hotelling (1929).
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38A Regression ﬁts
In this appendix, we develop further the quality of the estimation ﬁts. We focus on the
ability of the model to predict the inter-temporal variation that exist in the data.
Figure 10 aggregates the data and the model predictions across regions, and plots
the resulting time-series. Panel A shows consumption, panel B shows production, panel
C shows imports, and panel D shows average prices (imports are deﬁned as production
minus consumption). In each case, the model predictions mimic the inter-temporal patterns
observed in the data. Univariate regressions of the data on the prediction explain 96 percent
of the variation total consumption, 75 percent of the variation in total production, 76 percent
of the variation in imports, and 91 percent of the variation in average prices.40
Figure 11 provides analogous time-series ﬁts for eight of the time-series for cross-region
shipments. The data in panel A pertain to shipments from California (both Northern and
Southern) to Northern California, and are used in estimation. The data in the remaining
panels are excluded from the estimation procedure, so the corresponding ﬁts are out-of-
sample. As shown, the model predictions are close to the data in each panel and tend to
track the variation well (when variation exists).
B The uniqueness of equilibrium
The estimation procedure rests on uniqueness of equilibrium at each candidate parameter
vector. The results of a Monte Carlo experiment suggest the assumption holds, at least in
our application. We consider 300 parameter vectors for each of the 21 years in the sample, for
a total of 6,300 candidate parameter vectors. For each θi ∈ , we draw from the distribution
N(  µi,  σ2
i), where   µi and   σi are the coeﬃcient and standard error, respectively, reported in
Table 4. We then compute the numerical equilibrium for each parameter vector, using eleven
diﬀerent starting vectors. We deﬁne the elements of the starting vectors to be Pjnt = ϕPt,
where Pt is the average price of portland cement and ϕ = 0.5,0.6,...,1.4,1.5. Thus, we start
the equation solver at initial prices that sometimes understate and sometimes overstate the
average prices in the data. The experiment produces eleven equilibrium price vectors for
each parameter vector. We calculate the standard deviation of each price element across
the eleven observations. Thus, we would calculate 1,260 standard deviations for a typical
40The model does not fully capture the fall in average prices over the 1980s and early 1990s. One possible
explanation is that the model, as speciﬁed, does not incorporate potential changes to total factor productivity.
Dunne, Klimek, and Schmitz (2009) review the evidence regarding productivity and argue that the gradual
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Panel D: Prices
Figure 10: GMM Estimation Fits for Aggregate Metrics. The solid lines plot data and the dashed lines plot
predictions. Consumption, production, and imports are in millions of metric tonnes. Imports are deﬁned
as production minus consumption. Prices are constructed as a weighted-average of the plant-county prices
and are reported in dollars per metric tonne. The R2 values are calculated from univariate regressions of
the observed metric on the predicted metric.
equilibrium price vector with 1,260 plant-county elements. The experiment provides support
for the uniqueness condition if these standard deviations are small.41 This proves to be the
case. In fact, the maximum maximum standard deviation is zero, considering all prices and
draws, so the experiment ﬁnds no evidence of multiple equilibria.
C Estimation details
We minimize the objective function using the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm (Levenberg
(1944), Marquardt (1963)), which interpolates between the Gauss-Newton algorithm and the
method of gradient descent. We ﬁnd that the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm outperforms
simplex methods such as simulated annealing and the Nelder-Mead algorithm, as well as
41The equal-solver computes numerical equilibria for 90.3 percent of the candidate vectors. See Appendix
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Panel H: South CA to NV
Figure 11: GMM Estimation Fits for Cross-Region Shipments. The solid lines plot data and the dashed
lines plot predictions. Shipments are expressed as a percentage of production in California (panels A-D) or
Southern California (panels E-H).
quasi-Newton methods such as BFGS. We implement the minimization procedure using the
nls.lm function in R, which is downloadable as part of the minpack.lm package.
We compute numerical equilibrium using Fortran code that builds on the source code
of the dfsane function in R. The dfsane function implements the nonlinear equation solver
developed in La Cruz, Mart´ ınez, and Raydan (2006) and is downloadable as part of the
BB package. We ﬁnd that Fortran reduces the computational time of the inner loop by a
factor of 30 or more, relative to the dfsane function in R. The computation of equilibrium for
each time period can be parallelized, which further speeds the inner loop calculations. The
numerical computation of equilibrium takes between 2 and 12 seconds for most candidate
parameter vectors when run on a 2.40GHz dual core processor with 4.00GB of RAM.
We use observed prices to form the basis of the initial vector in the inner loop compu-
tations, which limits the distance that the nonlinear equation solver must “walk” to compute
numerical equilibrium. In practice, the equation solver occasionally fails to compute a nu-
merical equilibrium at the speciﬁed tolerance level (1e-13) within the speciﬁed maximum
number of iterations (600). The candidate parameter vectors that generate non-convergence
41in the inner loop tend to be less economically reasonable, and may be consistent with equi-
libria that are simply too distant from observed prices. When this occurs, we construct
regional-level metrics based on the price vector that comes closest to satisfying our deﬁni-
tion of numerical equilibrium.
We constrain the signs and/or magnitudes of some parameters, based on our under-
standing of economic theory and the economics of the portland cement industry, because
some parameter vectors hinder the computation of numerical equilibrium in the inner loop.
For instance, a positive price coeﬃcient would preclude the existence of Bertrand-Nash equi-
librium. We use the following constraints: the price and distance coeﬃcients (β1 and β2)
must be negative; the coeﬃcients on the marginal cost shifters () and the over-utilization
cost (γ) must be positive; and the coeﬃcients on the inclusive value (λ) and the utilization
threshold (ν) must be between zero and one. We use nonlinear transformations to implement
the constraints. As examples, we estimate the price coeﬃcient using   β1 = log(−β1) in the






calculate standard errors with the delta method.
D Data details
We make various adjustments to the data in order to improve consistency over time and
across diﬀerent sources. We discuss some of these adjustments here, in an attempt to build
transparency and aid replication.
The Minerals Yearbook reports the total production and average price of plants in the
“Nevada-Arizona-New Mexico” region over 1983-1991, and in the “Arizona-New Mexico”
region over 1992-2003. We scale the USGS production data downward, proportional to
plant capacity, to remove for the inﬂuence of the single New Mexico plant. Since the two
plants in Arizona account for 89 percent of kiln capacity in Arizona and New Mexico in
2003, we scale production by 0.89.
The portland cement plant in Riverside closed its kiln permanently in 1988 but contin-
ued operating its grinding mill with purchased clinker. We include the plant in the analysis
over 1983-1987, and we adjust the USGS production data to remove the inﬂuence of the
plant over 1988-2003 by scaling the data downward, proportional to plant grinding capac-
ities. Since the Riverside plant accounts for 7 percent of grinding capacity in Southern
California in 1988, so we scale the production data for that region by 0.93.
We exclude one plant in Riverside that produces white portland cement. White cement
42takes the color of dyes and is used for decorative structures. Production requires kiln temper-
atures that are roughly 50◦C hotter than would be needed for the production of grey cement.
The resulting cost diﬀerential makes white cement a poor substitute for grey cement.
The PCA reports that the California Cement Company idled one of two kilns at its
Colton plant over 1992-1993 and three of four kilns at its Rillito plant over 1992-1995, and
that the Calaveras Cement Company idled all kilns at the San Andreas plant following the
plant’s acquisition from Genstar Cement in 1986. We adjust plant capacity accordingly.
The data on coal and electricity prices from the Energy Information Agency are avail-
able at the state level starting in 1990. Only national-level data are available in earlier
years. We impute state-level data over 1983-1989 by (1) calculating the average discrep-
ancy between each state’s price and the national price over 1990-2000, and (2) adjusting the
national-level data upward or downward, in line with the relevant average discrepancy.
43